



Securing Transportation Assets & Operations

Mitigation Strategies for Highway Modes



Transportation
Security
Administration

INTRODUCTION

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Highway and Motor Carrier (HMC) Section and the Bus Industry Safety Council (BISC) collaborated with multiple HMC stakeholders to create this security guidance, which serves to enhance security awareness among the industry.

This guidance offers useful information, tips, and tools to strengthen the industry's resistance to disruption of its critical services. It contains viable options for consideration, but these recommended measures are **not** required by TSA or the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). TSA does not intend for the information in this document to conflict with or supersede existing regulatory requirements, statutory requirements, or laws. Furthermore, stakeholders using this guidance should ensure practices align with company/organizational policies and protocols prior to implementation.

While many of the security practices published in this document apply to all elements of the HMC community (i.e., trucking, commercial and school passenger carriers, and infrastructure), some meet only the needs of a specific stakeholder element. Where those circumstances occur, this guide attempts to note the exceptions.

If you have questions, comments, or suggestions about the content of this document, please contact TSA at HighwaySecurity@tsa.dhs.gov.

PLEASE NOTE: Always call 911 in the event of an emergency or immediate danger. Always follow organizational procedures, and when in doubt, err on the side of caution.



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CONTACT LIST

Below is a list of important contacts for security-related concerns. Use the blank areas to fill in your state and local non-emergency contacts.

The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) strictly prohibits commercial drivers from talking or texting on a hand-held mobile phone while the vehicle is in motion, which could cost the driver his or her commercial driver's license. An exception exists, however, "*when necessary to communicate with law enforcement officials or other emergency services.*"¹

Employees should report criminal activity and life-threatening situations via 911. Employers should consider requiring drivers to activate the GPS on enabled phones for any 911 call to help direct authorities to their location should they have a need for services. As stated, FMCSA allows emergency 911 calls while the vehicle is in motion, but only in these dire circumstances.

Non-emergency calls to TSA or law enforcement to report suspicious activity or persons are not exempted from U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) or local cell phone and texting regulations. Drivers may only make these calls while securely parked.

Always dial 911 in any emergency that requires immediate assistance from police, fire, or emergency medical services.

Non-Emergency Contacts

The National Terrorism Advisory System (NTAS) communicates information about terrorist threats by providing timely, detailed information to the public. To install the widget on your web browser, or to read the current NTAS Bulletin, visit www.dhs.gov/widget/ntas.

National

FBI Suspicious Activity/Crime Reporting **1-855-TELL-FBI (1-855-835-5324)**
TSA First Observer **1-844-TSA-FRST (1-844-872-3778)**

State

State Fusion Center _____

(Find yours at <https://nfcausa.org/default.aspx/MenuItemID/117/MenuGroup/Public+Home.htm>)

Local

Local Police Department _____

Local Fire/EMS Department _____

Local Hospital _____

Local FBI Field Office _____

(Find yours at <https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field/field-offices>)

Regional Cargo Theft Task Force _____

¹ 49 CFR §392.82(c)

INSIDER THREATS

An insider threat is an individual who poses a danger to the organization and usually comes from within, such as an employee, former employee, or contractor (e.g., disgruntled current or former employees). There are often indicators of violence prior to an insider becoming a serious danger to an organization. Further, foreign or domestic terrorist groups can influence employees, making their potential for harm even greater.

Violent employees and/or employees influenced by terrorist groups can become a serious risk to any organization. This section discusses indicators of both. All employees should be aware of these indicators and report them to a supervisor or the appropriate authorities as soon as possible. When encouraging employees to report suspicious activities, it is important to ensure you and your employees understand applicable non-retaliation/whistleblower guidance, laws, and regulations. For more information on this topic, visit www.whistleblowers.gov or www.osha.gov.

INDICATORS OF POTENTIAL VIOLENCE

Employees typically display indicators of potentially violent behavior over time. If individuals recognize these behaviors early, they are often manageable. Equipping employees and supervisors with the knowledge to recognize these indicators and report them through the appropriate channels may prevent an insider threat.

All employees should be aware of these indicators and take the following steps where appropriate: **observe** personal issues, **flag** possible indicators of workplace violence, and take **action** prior to violent activity.

Table 1: Potential Indicators and Prevention of Workplace Violence²

OBSERVE	FLAG	ACTION
Potential indicators of a subject's predisposition to workplace violence	The subject's actions that should encourage employees to investigate and bring to the attention of other employees	Actions that may indicate violent planning activities that warrant investigation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Depression/withdrawal • Repeated violations of company policies • Unexplained increase in absenteeism • Talks of problems at home • Noticeable decrease in attention to appearance and hygiene 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Noticeably unstable, emotional responses • Increased use of alcohol and/or illegal drugs • Increased severe mood swings • Escalation of domestic problems into the workplace • Resistance and overreaction to changes in policy and procedures 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Explosive outbursts of anger or rage without provocation • Suicidal comments • Behavior which is suspect of paranoia ("everybody is against me") • Talk of previous incidents of violence • Empathy with individuals committing violence • Increase in unsolicited comments about firearms, other dangerous weapons, and violent crimes

² U.S. Department of Homeland Security. "Active Shooter How to Respond." 2008. p. 10

INDICATORS OF EMPLOYEES INFLUENCED BY TERRORIST GROUPS

Another potential insider threat organizations face is the influence of employees by terrorist groups. Individuals often display indicators of such an influence. All employees should be aware of these indicators and should take the following steps where appropriate: **observe** personal issues, **flag** possible indicators of terrorist influence, and take **action** prior to violent activity.

Table 2: Potential Indicators and Prevention of Influence by Terrorist Groups³

OBSERVE	FLAG	ACTION
Potential indicators of a subject's predisposition to workplace violence	The subject's actions that should encourage employees to investigate and bring to the attention of other employees	Actions that may indicate violent planning activities that warrant investigation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Experiences personal crisis and does not properly recover • Complains about bias • Exhibits abrupt behavioral shifts • Lacks positive identity with coworkers, family, or friends • Is socially withdrawn (e.g., begins to avoid people and activities in the workplace) • Exhibits sudden reclusiveness • Advocates violence beyond what is "normal" • Demonizes others freely • Is frustrated with mainstream ideologies • Believes in government conspiracies to the point of paranoia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Isolates self from coworkers • Speaks about seeking revenge • Rhetoric is more intense and concentrated • Cuts ties with family and friends • Is personally connected with a grievance • Is sympathetic to terrorist groups • Establishes or visits websites/blogs that display extremist views • Exhibits extreme religious intolerance • Discusses attending rallies or other associations with extremists causes • Attempts to recruit others to extremist causes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shows a sudden visual shift from extreme to "normal" behavior to conceal extreme behavior • Advocates violence as a viable option for various situations • Exhibits new interests in public or government facilities • Takes suspicious or unreported travel (inside or outside of the continental United States) • Verbally indicates hatred for the United States and/or the Constitution • Discusses storing or collecting mass weapons or hazardous materials • Takes part in criminal activity or has trouble with law enforcement • Organizes protests inspired by extremist ideology • Inquires about weapons of mass effects

³ Asymmetric Warfare Group. "Radicalization into Violent Extremism." 2011.

ACTIVE SHOOTER/ASSAILANT THREATS

Active shooter/assailant situations have become increasingly more common in the workplace and in other public settings. Therefore, it is important for all individuals to plan and prepare for a possible active shooter/assailant threat. An active shooter/assailant is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area. In most cases, active shooters/assailants use firearms and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims. Active shooter/assailant situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly.

It is important to note that 60 percent of active shooter incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2013 ended before police arrived on scene. Furthermore, 70 percent of these incidents ended in five minutes or less. Even with rapid law enforcement response, it is imperative for civilians to prepare and train for an active shooter/assailant incident.⁴

A new tactic in which an assailant engages in the act of randomly cutting or stabbing persons in a crowded location has recently emerged internationally and in the United States. The assailant is generally prepared to die during the attack, much like a suicide bomber, and may display traits and indicators similar to a suicide bomber (see *Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Device* section of the document).

This section will discuss how to respond during an active shooter/assailant situation. Additionally, such situations may occur on a moving bus. This section includes response options for passenger carrier-specific situations.



HOW TO RESPOND IN A WORKPLACE/FACILITY⁵

Quickly determine the most reasonable way to protect your own life. If you find yourself involved in an active shooter/assailant situation, always remember to RUN, HIDE, FIGHT.

At any point during an active shooter/assailant situation, call 911 when it is safe to do so.

1. RUN

If there is an available escape path, attempt to evacuate the premises. Be sure to:

- Have an escape route and plan in mind
- Leave your belongings behind
- Prevent individuals from entering an area where the active shooter/assailant may be
- Keep your hands visible
- Do not attempt to move wounded people

2. HIDE

If evacuation is not possible, find a place to hide where the active shooter/assailant is less likely to find you. Your hiding place should be out of the active shooter/assailant's view and provide protection if shots are fired in your direction. To deter an active shooter/assailant from entering your hiding place:

- Lock the door and blockade it with heavy furniture
- Turn off any source of noise (e.g., cell phones, radios, televisions)
- Remain hidden and quiet

3. FIGHT

As a last resort, and **only when your life is in imminent danger**, attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter/assailant by acting as aggressively as possible.

⁴ U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. "A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 and 2013." 2013. p. 8

⁵ U.S. Department of Homeland Security. "Active Shooter How to Respond." 2008. p. 3

HOW TO RESPOND ON A PASSENGER CARRIER

Active shooter/assailant situations on a traveling passenger carrier are much different from those in a workplace facility. Below are the modified actions that passengers and drivers may implement during an active shooter/assailant situation aboard a **moving bus**. This includes both school buses and motorcoaches, keeping in mind that the passenger demographics may be different in the two situations, such as children in school buses, elderly in motorcoaches, etc.

Prior to departing a facility, stakeholders may consider providing a welcome/safety/security message to passengers. For example:

[Company Name] and the Transportation Security Administration remind you that security is everyone's responsibility. If you see something that is suspicious, notify the driver or authorities as quickly as practical. We also remind you that this vehicle is subject to routine safety and security inspection by law enforcement officers at any time. Thank you for your cooperation.

Although significant limitations may be present, passengers aboard a motorcoach or school bus should attempt to use the method of RUN, HIDE, FIGHT similar to an active shooter/assailant situation in a building.

1. RUN

This option is more limited onboard a moving passenger carrier; however, if the bus is not moving or if it is moving very slowly and an escape path is clear, running is still the best option during an active shooter/assailant situation. Opening emergency exit windows or doors to escape quickly may reduce the risk of falling victim to an active shooter/assailant.

2. HIDE

Should the bus be traveling at a speed that makes it unsafe to "run," the second option for passengers is to hide. Hiding spots are limited, but cover your body as much as possible by climbing under seats or in the onboard restroom.

3. FIGHT

As a last resort, attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter/assailant by acting as aggressively as possible. Throw items, yell, and use improvised weapons to deter his or her violence.

ADDITIONAL DRIVER RESPONSE OPTIONS⁶

Commercial drivers are individually responsible for the security and safety of their vehicles. Although company policy and training may define a driver's preferred actions while they are on the road and away from direct supervision, the decision to act in each unique situation ultimately falls to the driver.

In an active shooter/assailant situation, the judgment of the driver in the immediate circumstances of the attack will be critical. Though no company policy can or should dictate a driver's response, various bus-industry security specialists have identified several tactics drivers may consider implementing when the option to stop the vehicle safely and/or "run" is not available.

Note: These methods for response are options for consideration, **not** regulatory requirements. Following multiple exercises, BISC and TSA identified these as viable options for consideration, but individual company management teams will need to decide which options are best for use within their companies.

1. ASSESS

If something looks suspicious at a bus stop when pulling up, **do not stop**. Continue to drive past the stop and call dispatch or 911. However, if a shooter/assailant is onboard, attempt to stay calm and assess the situation.

⁶ Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program & Bus Industry Safety Council Operational Exercise, Tallahassee, FL. "After Action Report." 2014.

2. REACT

When feasible, the driver should make all attempts to stop the bus safely in the event of an active shooter/assailant onboard. If that is not a viable option, he or she can consider the following:

- Use alternate driving techniques to get the shooter/assailant off their feet
 - Swerve from side to side
 - Hit the brakes for rapid deceleration
 - Consider intentionally crashing the vehicle
- Activate the panic button, if available, and notify law enforcement as soon as possible
- If a panic button is not available, attempt to open an audio line to dispatch with a cell phone or radio call
- Engage passengers for assistance in neutralizing the threat
- Distract the shooter/assailant

3. EVACUATE

When the threat has been neutralized, or when it becomes safe to do so, disable the bus and evacuate the area.

HOW TO RESPOND WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES ON SCENE⁷

The following information applies to law enforcement response at both a facility or on a passenger carrier. Law enforcement's purpose is to stop the active shooter/assailant as soon as possible. Officers will proceed directly to the area in which shots were last heard or the shooter/assailant was last seen, or quickly board the bus (highlighting the importance of halting the vehicle as soon as possible). Officers may use pepper spray or tear gas to control the situation, and they may shout commands or push individuals to the ground for their safety.

Actions to take upon law enforcement arrival:

- Remain calm, and follow officers' instructions
- Put down any items in your hands (e.g., bags, jackets)
- Immediately raise hands and spread fingers
- Avoid making quick movements toward officers
- Avoid pointing, screaming, and/or yelling

Information to provide to law enforcement or 911 operator:

- Location of the active shooter/assailant
- Number of shooters/assailants, if more than one
- Physical description of shooter(s)/assailant(s)
- Number and type of weapons held by the shooter(s)/assailant(s)
- Number of potential victims at the location



Once you have reached a safe location or an assembly point, law enforcement will likely hold you in that area until the situation is under control and they have identified and questioned all witnesses. Do not leave until law enforcement authorities have instructed you to do so.

⁷ U.S. Department of Homeland Security. "Active Shooter How to Respond." 2008. p. 5

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES



An Improvised Explosive Device (IED) is a “homemade” bomb and/or device used to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract. Criminals, vandals, terrorists, suicide bombers, and insurgents may use IEDs, which can come in many forms, ranging from a small pipe bomb to a sophisticated device capable of causing massive damage and loss of life.⁸ This section will discuss indicators of IEDs, common IED components, and recommended steps to take if you find something suspicious in the workplace or on a passenger or cargo carrier.

USDOT regulations require all drivers to conduct pre- and post-trip inspections of their vehicle for potential safety hazards at

the beginning and end of each workday. These are also perfect opportunities to inspect for potential security threats. Drivers should conduct equally diligent inspections after each stop during the workday where the vehicle remains unattended and unobserved for any period of time. If motorcoach drivers open underfloor cargo holds to add luggage or package express items, they should scrutinize these areas and packages.

Following the indicators below, drivers should make careful inspections of all places where an explosive or vehicle-disabling device might be hidden from sight. Inspections of commercial motorcoaches may also include all on-board package storage areas and in lavatories where the odor of explosives or chemical devices might be masked by cleaning or disinfectant solutions.

IED INDICATORS⁹

- To determine what makes a package suspicious, consider applying the **HOT** acronym. A package is suspicious if:
- **The package is Hidden.** The package is in an area not easily observed but has high traffic or is in a critical area. There may be a very important person or media activity close by. On a passenger or cargo carrier, it may be tucked away in a place that everyday individuals should not have access to or clearly shoved in a place that it does not belong or fit.
- **The package is Obviously suspicious.** There are wires showing, fumes/odors coming from the package, or it is leaking, ticking, or smoking.
- **The package is not in a Typical area.** The package is in an atypical area. On passenger and cargo carriers, it is common to find packages left in cargo holds or in overhead compartments; however, a package may be suspicious if it is found in an onboard bathroom compartment or near the fuel tanks.

If the package is **HOT**, do not touch it! Call the proper authorities immediately.

Several of the indicators listed below are items that should cause suspicion during USDOT pre- and post-trip inspections. They may be onboard the vehicle or in the general vicinity of the vehicle:

- Any assembly of pipe parts not in a primary use/storage location
- Any item that appears to be weighted down (such as a bag, container, or heavy-looking item)
- Compressed gas cylinder with items taped/attached to it
- Item with dead birds, mice, or insects close by (could be a poison or radioactive bomb)
- An anti-American poster
- Discarded shiny or seemingly new items (such as a basketball, weapon, or bicycle without a lock)
- Out-of-place computers, disc players, or flashlights

⁸ U.S. Department of Homeland Security. “News & Terrorism A fact sheet from the National Academies and the Department of Homeland Security.” p. 1.

⁹ Bureau of Justice Assistance. “Recognition Indicators for Terrorist-Type IEDs.” The State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program, 2007.

COMMON IED COMPONENTS

Many commonly available materials, such as fertilizer, gunpowder, and hydrogen peroxide, can be ingredients used to make IEDs. Explosives must contain a fuel and an oxidizer, which provides the oxygen needed to sustain the reaction. A common example is ANFO, a mixture of ammonium nitrate, which acts as the oxidizer, and fuel oil (the fuel source). Another example is Triacetone triperoxide, known as TATP. It is a peroxide-based explosive that when combined with other readily available household ingredients creates an extremely volatile IED. TATP is a crystalline white powder that detonates with the slightest friction or temperature change.

The trucking industry often transports common IED components; therefore, it is important for drivers and managers to recognize the threat those items may carry. If you see a suspicious person in the area while loading such components onto a truck, this is cause for concern and you should report it to management or appropriate authorities.

Homemade explosives contain an oxidizer and a fuel. The tables below list common types of both.

Table 3: Common Oxidizers

Oxidizers
Ammonia
Ammonium Nitrate
Ammonium Perchlorate
Calcium Ammonium Nitrate
Chlorine
Chromic Acid
Hydrochloric/Muriatic Acid
Hydrogen Peroxide
Nitric Acid
Potassium Chlorate
Potassium Nitrate
Sodium Chlorate
Sodium Perchlorate
Sulfuric Acid/Drain Cleaner

Table 4: Common Fuels

Fuels
Aluminum Powder
Benzene
Glycerin
Hexamine
Kerosene/Diesel Fuel
Nitro-Methane
Phenol/Aspirin
Sugar
Toluene
Various seeds

STEPS TO TAKE IF YOU SEE SOMETHING SUSPICIOUS

It can be difficult to determine when to report something suspicious. People most familiar with a given environment are in the best position to determine whether something is out of the ordinary. Use common sense, and follow these guidelines:

- Trust your instincts; if something feels wrong, do not ignore it
- Do not assume that someone else has already reported it
- Call 911 or local authorities
- Keep your distance from a suspicious package—do not approach or tamper with it

When you make a report, be ready to provide your name, your location, a description of what you think is suspicious, and the time you saw it.

VEHICLE-BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

A Vehicle-Borne IED (VBIED) is an IED for which a vehicle is the delivery mechanism (i.e., container), which can carry significantly more explosive material, and therefore cause more damage.

There are many potential indicators of VBIEDs in vehicles. If you notice any of the following in a vehicle near your workplace or other transportation facility, take appropriate actions and call authorities immediately.¹⁰ Reasons for concern include:

- Heavy, sagging vehicle (rear-weighted)
- Illegally parked vehicle, especially near crowded access points
- Unusually covered or tinted windows
- Large containers on seats or cargo area: bags, boxes, barrels, tanks
- License plates removed, obscured, or altered
- Odor of gasoline, diesel fuel, propane, acids, or chemicals
- Visible wires, switches, batteries, or antennae inside or on a vehicle
- Cargo concealed with a tarp or blanket
- Vehicle with false indication of distress or in a location for an extended length of time
- Driver/passengers abandoning or fleeing a vehicle stopped in roadway

These indicators may be innocent by themselves, but should cause suspicion when seen in combination. If you observe any of these indicators, call appropriate authorities immediately.

PASSENGER CARRIER-SPECIFIC THREATS

Buses are at risk of being the target of an attack, as an IED stored on board a bus can cause multiple fatalities at one time.

Tour buses, school buses, and other passenger carriers often have access to places that other motor vehicles cannot approach, putting them at risk for use as VBIEDs. Company management, as well as drivers, should be cognizant of their routes and the risks that a certain location may bring.

Drivers should take extra precaution on routes that approach higher-risk facilities such as government buildings, military bases/facilities, schools, hospitals, national monuments, houses of worship, or other heavily populated venues.

If something is suspicious, **do not** proceed on the route planned. Call 911 and dispatch, and disable the vehicle at another location until authorities arrive to investigate.



¹⁰ U.S. Department of Homeland Security. "TRIPwire, Vehicle-Borne IED Identification Guide: Parked Vehicles."

CARGO CARRIER-SPECIFIC THREATS

Trucks carry large quantities of potentially dangerous items on a daily basis, putting them at risk for use as a VBIED facilitator, more than a target. It is important for drivers to note the following indicators for tampering on a tractor-trailer:

- Holes in floor/cargo areas
- Unusual odors
- New and/or shiny bolts or screws
- Recently painted exterior
- Additional fuel tanks
- Dangling wires, unfamiliar wires, or wires that do not go anywhere
- Unusual fingerprints (oil/greasy)
- Bulky items in compartment or cargo area concealed from view
- False compartments



If you observe any of these indicators during pre- or post-trip inspection, call appropriate authorities (such as 911, local emergency contacts, and/or per company policy) immediately.

PERSON-BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

A Person-Borne IED (PBIED) is an IED for which a person, often a “suicide bomber,” is the delivery mechanism. A suicide bomber is prepared to die while deploying an explosive device that will inflict maximum casualties and damage. Suicide bombers generally hide PBIEDs underneath clothing or carry them in a bag, backpack, or other container commonly seen at bus terminals. Because of their general appearance as “just another passenger,” the suicide bomber presents a very significant threat to the transportation industry.

Case studies in Israel have resulted in some potential indicators for identifying suspected suicide bombers.

PBIED INDICATORS¹¹

- Wearing heavy clothing that is inconsistent with weather conditions
- Repeatedly patting exterior clothing (to ensure concealed items are intact)
- Bulges observed under the clothing, particularly around the midsection
- Holding one or both arms in an unnatural position, with closed fist(s)
- Hiding or obscuring hands from view
- Attempting to “blend in” with others in crowd
- Avoiding contact with or observation by law enforcement or security personnel
- A “distant” or “blank” look and failure to respond to verbal commands

Suicide bombers generally have an accomplice or “handler” nearby that may have the ability to detonate the IED remotely. A suspicious person interacting with or looking toward a second suspect may be an additional indicator.

If you identify any of these indicators, contact law enforcement immediately.

¹¹ Dzikansky, Mordecai Z. NYPD Detective (Ret). “Policing in an Era of Terrorism-Seminar.” NY Metro Transit Police HQ, New York, NY. 6 November 2015. Lecture.

BOMB THREATS

Bomb threats often occur via phone, and it is important to take all threats seriously until proven otherwise. It is important to act quickly, remain calm, and obtain as much information from the caller as possible. The following section includes bomb threat call procedures and a bomb threat checklist.

BOMB THREAT PROCEDURES¹²

DO:

- Remain calm
- Keep the caller on the line for as long as possible; DO NOT HANG UP, even if the caller does
- Listen carefully, be polite, and show interest
- Try to keep the caller talking to learn more information
- If possible, write a note to a colleague to call the authorities or, as soon as the caller hangs up, immediately notify them yourself
- If your phone has a display, copy the number and/or letters on the window display
- Complete the Bomb Threat Checklist immediately; write down as much detail as you can remember, and try to get exact words of the caller
- Immediately upon termination of the call, do not hang up, but from a different phone (**not a cellular phone**), contact police with information and await instructions.

DO NOT:

- Use two-way radios or cellular phones; radio signals have the potential to detonate a bomb
- Evacuate the building until police arrive and evaluate the threat
- Activate the fire alarm
- Touch or move a suspicious package

BOMB THREAT CHECKLIST¹³

Date: _____

Time: _____

Time Caller Hung Up: _____

Phone Number: _____

Ask Caller:

Where is the bomb located? (Building, floor, room, etc.) _____

When will it go off? _____

What does it look like? _____

What kind of bomb is it? _____

What will make it explode? _____

Did you place the bomb? Yes No

Why? _____

What is your name? _____

¹² U.S. Department of Homeland Security. "Bomb Threat Call Procedures, Bomb Threat Checklist."

¹³ Ibid.

Exact words of threat: _____

Information about caller:

Where is the caller located? (Background and level of noise) _____

Estimated age: _____

Is voice familiar? If so, who does it sound like? _____

Other points: _____

Identifiable accent: _____

Caller's Voice:

- Male
- Female
- Accent
- Lisp
- Clearing throat
- Coughing
- Cracking voice
- Deep
- Disguised
- Loud
- Soft
- Stutter
- Nasally
- Raspy
- Slurred
- Slow

Caller Sounds:

- Angry
- Calm
- Excited
- Hurried
- Laughing
- Normal
- Upset/Crying

Background Sounds:

- Animal noises
- House noises
- Kitchen noises
- Street noises
- Conversation
- Music
- Motor
- Clear
- Static
- Office machinery
- Factory machinery

Threat Language:

- Incoherent
- Message read
- Taped
- Irrational
- Profane
- Well-spoken

Bomb threats may also occur via email, handwritten note, or package.

If a bomb threat occurs via handwritten note:

- Call _____
- Handle the note as minimally as possible

If a bomb threat occurs via email:

- Call _____
- Do not delete the message

A suspicious package may have one or more of the following indicators:

- No return address
- Excessive postage
- Stains
- Strange odor
- Strange sounds
- Unexpected delivery
- Poorly handwritten
- Misspelled words
- Incorrect titles
- Foreign postage
- Restrictive notes

BOMB THREAT STAND-OFF DISTANCES

Law enforcement may recommend the evacuation distances below based on the type of bomb threat; however, you should always follow law enforcement instructions regarding safe distances, which may differ from the table below. Do not evacuate the building until authorities have told you to do so.¹⁴

Table 5: Bomb Threat Stand-Off Distances¹⁵

Threat Description	Explosives Capacity	Mandatory Evacuation Distance	Shelter-in-Place Zone	Preferred Evacuation Distance
Pipe Bomb	5 lbs	70 ft	71-1199 ft	+1200 ft
Suicide Bomber	20 lbs	110 ft	111-1169 ft	+1700 ft
Briefcase/Suitcase	50 lbs	150 ft	151-1849 ft	+1850 ft
Car	500 lbs	320 ft	321-1899 ft	+1900 ft
SUV/Van	1,000 lbs	400 ft	401-2399 ft	+2400 ft
Small Delivery Truck	4,000 lbs	640 ft	641-3799 ft	+3800 ft
Container/Water Truck	10,000 lbs	860 ft	861-5099 ft	+5100 ft
Semi-Trailer	60,000 lbs	1570 ft	1571-9299 ft	+9300 ft

¹⁴ U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security. "Bomb Threat Stand-Off Card."

¹⁵ Ibid.



CONCLUSION

This security guidance identifies potential threats to the HMC transportation mode. The industry continues to search for best practices to train personnel and mitigate the effects of these incidents. TSA recommends that companies incorporate this information into overall security programs, as each company deems appropriate. Additionally, this is a dynamic document that TSA intends to update, as needed, to meet the current threat environment.

If you have questions, comments, or suggestions about the content of this document, please contact TSA at HighwaySecurity@tsa.dhs.gov.



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ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

ASSESSMENTS AND PLANNING

- *Highway Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancements (BASE)* is a voluntary, risk-based program designed to identify security vulnerabilities within the various highway transportation modes and, in turn, offer mitigation options for reducing those vulnerabilities. HighwaySecurity@dhs.gov
- *The Transportation Security Template and Assessment Review Toolkit (T-START)* provides (1) an Overview of Security, (2) guidance on conducting a Vulnerability Assessment, and (3) instructions on completing a Security Plan. HighwaySecurity@dhs.gov

TRAINING AND OTHER RESOURCES

- *First Observer /First Observer Plus* is a security domain awareness video training program focusing on delivery of a simple message to highway transportation professionals to “Observe, Assess, and Report” suspicious activities. <http://tsa.gov/firstobserver>
- *Counterterrorism Guides* are intended to provide an awareness of specific issues that should be considered when developing and implementing your organization’s security plan. HighwaySecurity@dhs.gov
- *Intermodal Security Training & Exercise Program (I-STEP)* provides exercise, training, and security planning tools and services to the transportation community. HighwaySecurity@dhs.gov
- *Exercise Information System (EXIS)* is an online exercise tool that provides users with resources to design, document, and evaluate exercises for all transportation modes. <http://exis.tsa.dhs.gov>
- *TSA Surface Transportation Cybersecurity Resource Toolkit for Small and Midsize Business (SMB)* is a collection of documents designed to provide cyber risk-management information to surface transportation operators. TSA-Surface@tsa.dhs.gov

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